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8Political Stability: 
Crucial for Growth? 
At first glance it seems like a straightforward proposition. The African states that have been able to achieve high growth rates are stable; stability means a predictable 
political environment, which in turn attracts investment, both 
internally and from outside. The resulting virtuous circle of poverty 
reduction, job creation, increased state revenues and investment 
in welfare and education bring benefits to all in society such that 
a return to violence or chaos is in no-one’s interests. Not quite Switzerland, but getting there. 
But, as always, the devil is in the definitions. Specifically, what type of stability do we mean? 
It may seem a glib point, but there are a number of African states that do not normally make 
it on to the list of high-performers, that nonetheless have remarkably stable political systems. 
Military dictatorships are stable; Eritrea shows absolutely no signs of internal unrest yet is 
economically moribund, reliant on remittances and external assistance. The Gambia is tightly in 
the grip of President Jammeh, as it has been since 1994, and remains as impoverished as ever. 
The list of long-standing Heads of State in Africa trips off the tongue: President Dos Santos of 
Angola has been in power since 1979, as has President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, though 
interestingly each has had spectacular growth rates in recent years due to oil revenues. And 
change doesn’t necessarily arrive even when these political survivors depart the scene. Recent 
years have seen a series of family successions, with Bongo fils seamlessly taking the reins 
from Bongo pere in Gabon, likewise the transition from Gnassingbe to Gnassingbe in Togo. 
More importantly, even when an old elite seems to have been excised, incoming leaders take on 
the mantle of the outgoing with a barely-disguised enthusiasm. The Democratic Republic of the 
Congo is a good example. The hope of Mobutu’s toppling in 1997 lasted barely months before 
Kabila’s aura slipped and the old patterns of Congolese politics reasserted themselves. The seminal 
work on Zairean systems of government was written in the 1980s, but change a few names and it 
could be describing the Congo of the present, despite the cataclysmic upheavals of more than 15 
years of war. Though Nigeria’s byzantine politics seems to have lost the military involvement of the 
past, the pattern of personal enrichment, local patronage and national chaos remains the same. 
Though all these examples differ significantly, the key point is that political systems based 
on personal networks and exploitation of the state for profit – call it neo-patrimonialism or 
the ‘politics of the belly’ – have proved remarkably robust since independence, despite a 
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9manifest inadequacy in generating growth 
or meeting the basic needs of the vast 
majority. They have survived waves of 
conflict, the explosion of NGO activism, a 
rich variety of development orthodoxies and 
a never-ending stream of external actors 
hoping to reshape the continent. Thus far, 
African political elites have outlived them all. 
It seems therefore that when we talk about 
political stability in the context of growth, 
resource-driven bubbles aside we mean a 
specific kind of stability: the rule of law, strong 
institutions rather than powerful individuals, 
a responsive and efficient bureaucracy, low 
corruption and a business climate that is 
conducive to investment. It is difficult to 
deny that these factors of stability seem to 
be important for growth, perhaps even key, 
but it is a rather technocratic, administrative 
view. Indeed, there is little here one would 
instinctively recognise as politics in any 
another context; meaningful competition 
between ideologies, ideas and alternative 
visions of state function and responsibility. 
In fact, what we really seem to be saying is 
that stable governance seems to be crucial 
for growth. The distinction may seem 
academic, but it is an important one to 
recognise. Governance is not politics, despite 
how tempting it may be to conflate them. 
Take, as examples, the paradigmatic success 
stories of post-Cold War development 
interventions in Africa: Ethiopia, Rwanda and 
Uganda. Each has been held up as offering 
a new model, with efficient administrations 
headed by highly-capable and respected 
leaders. Set against the corrupt dynasties 
embedded elsewhere on the continent, 
the rise of these states from the ashes left 
by years of war seemed to offer hope that 
the dream of progress was possible. Each 
has, beyond doubt, made considerable 
strides in rebuilding their shattered 
economies, infrastructures and societies. 
Stable governance, to a greater or lesser 
extent, is manifestly present in each, 
particularly in comparison to the preceding 
regimes. But stable politics? In one sense, 
yes; though elections have been held in all 
three countries in the post-Cold War period, 
there has never been much of a risk of the 
incumbent losing. Uganda’s 2006 Presidential 
election, the only one to be held under a multi-
party system introduced the previous year, 
was perhaps the closest, despite the leading 
challenger spending half of the campaign 
period defending himself in court. Ethiopia’s 
election in 2005 had a surprisingly close result, 
at least until a large number of opposition 
gains were annulled. Tens of thousands of 
opposition activists were detained after the 
resulting protests. And Rwanda’s political 
space is tightly controlled, with all meaningful 
opposition parties members of a coalition 
with the ruling RPF, offering little by way of 
a genuine alternative. President Kagame won 
the last elections with more than 95% of the 
vote.  So in fact, in these cases stable politics 
seems to be synonymous with no politics 
at all. Or at least, no competitive politics. 
The point here is not to argue whether this 
is right or wrong, in spite of the premium 
placed on democracy in donor discourse. 
Rwanda’s tightly controlled political sphere 
may be right for Rwanda, just as there are 
few complaints over the fact that Botswana’s 
government has been drawn from the same 
political party since independence. Ghana’s 
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competitive politics – most recently demonstrated by the peaceful handover of power after 
elections in 2008, despite the potentially-explosive tight margin of the result – may not fit 
well in Ethiopia’s fractured ethnic mosaic, or the legacy of thousands of years of history and 
centralised administration. Rwanda is an old and proud nation, with deep-seated traditions; 
its political DNA has no doubt had a powerful role in shaping the current settlement. 
It is instead merely to point out that though Rwandan or Ethiopian modes of governing may fit 
neatly with contemporary ideas of governance, and give rise to healthy growth rates – unlike the 
less growth-friendly patrimonial systems identified above - we should not let the binary of stability 
and growth obscure the complex and contingent world of local political and social realities. Instead 
of a technically-defined cipher, all states have their own dynamics that demand respect. They also 
need to be understood, particularly by those external agents seeking to shape the future of these 
states, but also by the continent as a whole, because the second tacit assumption underpinning 
the argument that political stability is crucial to growth is that growth is in turn crucial to stability. 
At the risk of over-generalisation, an assumption of development policy in recent years – in 
as much as it has been spelled out – has been that growth will simultaneously strengthen the 
state and improve the lives of the poor such that competitive politics will follow naturally. In 
the meantime, development would improve lives to such a degree that pressure for political 
change would be a very long time in coming, allowing institutions and society to mature to 
the point where political competition would not prove too disruptive, or a catalyst for identity-
based mobilisation and the risk of fracture. In other words, it has been assumed that in the 
short term, the overwhelmingly rural populations of African countries would be content with 
incremental improvements in their life chances, leading in the longer term to the emergence 
of an educated population with a shared understanding of the parameters of peaceful politics. 
But this is not a given. Growth may bring with it different, and unanticipated, consequences. 
Economic growth leads to a rise in the visibility and power of the middle class, a classic 
catalyst for social and political upheaval. Changes in economic patterns lead to the drift 
of populations to the cities. The youth demographic is growing across the continent, 
increasingly educated and unwilling to return to the limited horizons of an agrarian life; 
thousands of graduates of Kampala’s Makarere University end up in the city’s slums every year. 
Indeed, it is possible that the next wave of change in Africa will be born from these 
factors. Faced with a constrained politics controlled by an older generation, it may 
be that new poles of mobilisation will emerge; a few years ago no-one would have 
predicted that a former DJ would end up as President of Madagascar. A new youth 
politics of urban mobilisation could fundamentally reshape Africa’s political landscape. 
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The wider point is that a world-view that exchanges politics for governance 
has very little ability to predict such dynamics, or produce policy that can 
adequately deal with them. It may be that Rwandans are indeed happy 
with President Kagame’s ongoing leadership, and genuinely don’t mind 
that their political alternatives are limited as long as their lives improve. 
It may be that Ugandans are content with Museveni and the National 
Resistance Movement, as long as the economy keeps growing, 
and Ethiopians with the continued dominance of a Tigrayan elite. 
But it may not. Rwanda seemed a model of stability in the 1980s, 
hosting a wide variety of external actors. The failure of the international 
community to predict or respond to the genocide has been well 
documented. This is not to say that Rwanda faces similar risks today 
– such a conclusion is far beyond the scope of this paper – but simply 
that we should learn the lesson of the past and give the complex 
and varied political cultures of Africa the respect that is instinctively 
given elsewhere in the world; allowing them to be both powerfully 
constitutive of local realities and hugely varied across the continent. 
So, to conclude, political stability is no doubt key to growth, for a given 
and highly particular vision of what stability means. But, while the 
governance agenda underlying this view is undoubtedly important, it 
needs to be tempered with an appreciation that other types of politics 
– the messy, murky, complex and local kind – cannot be wished away, 
and are remarkably robust. This is obvious for those states where local 
politics reward corruption and growth is a distant dream; for the donor 
darlings of recent years it may be hidden under a carapace of progress 
that can look all-too convincing from the cab of a white 4x4. Attitudes 
and policy towards Africa needs to be rooted in understanding that 
goes beyond the seductive simplicity of governance and growth. 
